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AbstrAct
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a key region for the success of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. However, there is no consensus about 
the contribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the promotion 
of economic growth and the reduction of extreme poverty in this region. We 
therefore build an analytical framework of the distorting effects of foreign 
aid, and make the subsequent estimations during the period 1991–2014 for 
SSA. We find four main results: i) ODA to SSA has exerted both distorting and 
stimulating effects on growth but the latter effects were larger than the former; 
ii) increasing both aid grants and aid loans, and increasing the ratio of loans 
to grants, may induce higher growth; iii) however, such a reallocation may only 
be positive in countries with sustainable debt burdens; and iv) although ODA 
was effective in aggregate terms, it did not significantly boost the mean income 
corrected from inequality, which reveals a grave distributional deficiency.
Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa; poverty eradication; aid effectiveness; 
Sustainable Development Goals; institutional distortions. 
resumen
La región de África Subsahariana (ASS) es clave para el éxito de la Agenda 
2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible. Sobre la base de las diferencias de las 
distintas modalidades de ayuda, analizamos el efecto generado por la Ayuda 
Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) sobre el ritmo de crecimiento y la reducción de la 
pobreza en ASS en el periodo 1991-2014. Para ello construimos un modelo 
analístico sobre los efectos distorsionadores de la ayuda, cuya estimación 
proporciona cuatro resultados relevantes: i) la ayuda externa ejerce tanto 
efectos estimulantes como distorsionadores sobre el crecimiento, pero los 
primeros compensan los segundos; ii) un aumento en ambas modalidades 
de ayuda y una reasignación entre donaciones y préstamos podría inducir 
un mayor crecimiento; iii) sin embargo, dicha reasignación sólo sería positiva 
en países con niveles sostenibles de endeudamiento; y iv) aunque la ayuda 
es eficaz a nivel agregado, no contribuyó significativamente a aumentar el 
ingreso medio corregido por la desigualdad, lo que revela una grave carencia 
distributiva.
Palabras clave: África; eficacia de la ayuda; donaciones de ayuda; créditos 
de ayuda; distorsiones institucionales.
JEL Clasificación: F35.
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1. introduction
Drawing on the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, “eradicate 
extreme poverty for all people everywhere” is the first of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). This was solemnly stated by the world’s heads 
of state in the 2015 United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s Declaration, 
Transforming our world:
We resolve, between now and 2030, to end poverty and hunger 
everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among countries; […]. We 
resolve also to create conditions for sustainable, inclusive and sustained 
economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into 
account different levels of national development and capacities (UN 2015: 6).
Despite being a promising global commitment to promoting development, 
is the goal of eradicating poverty realistic and achievable in a 15-year period? 
Many analysts find that it is not overambitious as it has been previously proven 
by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which successfully contributed 
to halve the average number of people living in extreme poverty (see, among 
others, ODI, 2015 and Sachs, 2015). They consequently expect similar 
development strategies and assistance to accomplish the SDG.
However, given the huge disparities in regional achievements and the 
differences in poverty levels across developing countries, such a generalisation 
may be misleading. In particular, one could reasonably wonder whether such 
a positive forecast is valid for a region such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The 
answer from the most “optimistic” analysts is a conditional “yes”. They argue 
that ending poverty in SSA is feasible, provided that developed countries 
donate more –and more stable– aid (ODI, 2015; UN, 2015). Moreover, 
a number of investigations have confirmed a fast reduction of poverty and 
inequality in SSA (Fosu, 2015; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2014).
Conversely, from a more “pessimistic” viewpoint, other authors argue that 
foreign aid is not part of the solution but the problem itself. They suggest a 
“dead aid model” (replacement of Official Development Assistance by market-
based development fundings) which would not distort recipient countries’ 
economic and political environments (Akonor, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Ogundipe 
et al., 2014). These contradictory viewpoints raise a fundamental question: is 
aid a way into or a way out of growth and poverty in SSA?
No clear answer comes from the above-mentioned two leading streams of 
the aid literature, and since they are mutually exclusive, they do not provide 
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a single, irrefutable, conclusion. As SSA is the critical region for the goal of 
eradicating extreme poverty by 2030, and it has also become the main 
recipient of global ODA since the 1990s, the success of the SDG will clearly 
depend on the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting Africa’s development. 
Hence further investigations into the controversy surrounding the effectiveness 
of aid in SSA are crucial and timely.
Given that the seemingly never-ending controversy surrounding the 
macroeconomic effectiveness of aid is rooted in the assumption that ODA 
distorts SSA’s economies, we differentiate two aid modalities –aid grants 
and aid loans– which may impact differently on economic growth. Indeed, 
aid loans and grants have different financial natures that should be clearly 
contemplated when assessing the macro-effectiveness of ODA. Furthermore, 
we distinguish two types of aid impacts: the “overall” impact of aid on growth 
and the “inequality-adjusted” impact.
With this perspective, this paper has the major goal of assessing the impact 
of aid and its components on both poverty and the overall economic prosperity. 
It elaborates on this major goal within two investigation frameworks: firstly, it 
analyses the relative impacts of aid grants and aid loans on the rate of growth 
and the inequality-adjusted growth of SSA countries’ per capita income during 
the period 1991-2014. And secondly, it explores the main “distorting effects” 
that ODA causes on the recipient economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews 
the debate on the “aid-growth nexus” in SSA. The third section proposes an 
analytical model of aid impact on growth, adapted to the peculiarities of the 
SSA region, and estimated by means of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 
The fourth section presents the main results of the analysis and the last section 
summarises the conclusions and suggests some economic policies that may 
increase the effectiveness of aid disbursed to SSA.
2. the Aid eFFectiveness puzzle in ssA
Between 1995 and 2014, SSA’s growth has shown a positive trend with 
relatively high growth rates, fluctuating between 4 and 8 % (Graphic 1). Apart 
from year 2009 (due to the financial crisis effect described in Fosu, 2015), 
that trend was observed along the whole MDGs’ era. If SSA keeps growing at 
this pace, it will double its annual GDP per capita in 9 to 18 years starting with 
the SDGs’ launching year 2015 and, if this growth benefits the poor, SSA will 
advance towards the goal of eradicating income poverty (Mongongo, 2016). 
More importantly, it has been recently shown that this remarkable growth is 
accompanied by significant increases in the income of the poorest citizens 
(Fosu, 2015; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2014).
Nevertheless, similar optimistic forecasts about SSA’s growth were made 
in the 1960s, and they were eventually proven to be wrong as the economic 
performance was poor from 1972 to 1994 (see Graphic 1 and Maddison, 
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2001). What ensures that the ongoing forecasts in terms of economic growth 
and poverty reduction are more accurate than those made 50 years ago? To 
shed light on this question, development researchers have investigated both 
the causes of the poor performance observed during the “lost development 
decades” and the key determinants of the current performance. In this context, 
Collier and Gunning (1999) pointed out the low level of both private and public 
domestic investments. Given that the average income in SSA was (and is still) 
below the subsistence level needed to generate savings, some economists 
saw in foreign aid an alternative to savings in order to boost and maintain 
the capital accumulation process and the subsequent economic growth 
(Sachs, 2005a and 2005b). This argument explains why SSA has become the 
main ODA recipient with an average share of between 40 and 50 % of total 
disbursements since 1992 (Graphic 2).
Is this positive co-movement since the mid 1990s between “more aid” 
and “higher economic growth” a simple correlation or an actual causality? 
Policymakers, aid agencies and some researchers claim that not only ODA 
causes and sustains the observed growth but also that keeping its delivery 
would ensure against re-experiencing the “lost development decades” in SSA 
(Cameron et al., 2013; ODI, 2015; Sachs, 2015; UN 2006, 2015).
Likewise —but in a more nuanced way—, Adam and Bevan (2006)’s empirical 
analysis of the impact of aid inflows on real macroeconomic aggregates, shows 
grAphic 1. growth dynAmics in SSA: 1961-2014
Source: World Bank (2016).
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that foreign aid allocated in the acquisition of scarce public infrastructures 
induces higher economic growth provided that those infrastructures increase 
productivity in the private sector. As a matter of facts, SSA is still largely in 
need of public infrastructures that would boost private sector productivity. In 
this sense, Adam and Bevan (2006)’s findings imply that well allocated aid is 
susceptible to induce growth and reduce poverty in SSA. On the other hand, 
Adam et al. (2009) investigate the aid macroeconomic impact but from a 
monetary perspective. They find that foreign aid play an inflation-stabilisation 
role by aligning domestic deficit financing with the demand for domestic base 
money, especially by avoiding seigniorage to cover government deficits. This 
results in higher domestic consumption as it keeps prices low and induces 
more investments.
All in all, these findings show that aid inflows may have positive outcomes 
on both nominal and real macroeconomic aspects when they are rightly 
used. What happens if aid is “wrongly” used? As illustration, they explained 
the cases of Ethiopia and Ghana, where aid was not productively absorbed 
(it only increased the monetary reserves to elude the Dutch disease on the 
exchange rate); and the cases of Tanzania and Uganda, where there were 
crowding-out fiscal effects due to aid. This issue of negative impacts of aid has 
been further investigated by researchers grouped within the so-called “aid-
sceptic development literature”. Some findings questioned aid by rejecting 
the previously-mentioned poverty trap and big push models used by aid-
optimistic researchers to advocate for more aid to developing countries. 
grAphic 2. regionAl odA As A percentAge shAre oF totAl net disbursements: 1960-2014
Source: DAC (2016) and World Bank (2016).
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Others elaborated on the counter-productive effects of wrongly used aid from 
an institutional perspective.
Among many others, Kraay and Raddatz (2007) contradict the existence of 
poverty trap in SSA on the one hand. On the other hand, other development 
researchers argue that ODA distorts the economic and political institutions that 
SSA needs to consolidate in order to accelerate the pace of economic growth 
and (income) poverty reduction (see, for instance, Easterly, 2002 and 2006; 
Moyo, 2009). Given that most SSA leaders control the economic and the political 
power, this pessimism meets Angeles et al.’s (2009) analysis showing that in 
such a case where elites are more concerned by their own wellbeing than that 
of the less-well off, the likelihood of misusing aid is very high. Pedersen (2001) 
spells out such perverse effects —the so-called “institutional distortions”— within 
the framework of Buchanan’s (1975) Samaritan’s dilemma. In order to get more 
aid —he argues—, recipient governments would cut down poverty-reducing 
efforts as more misery is expected to make donors more altruistic. Similarly, 
the existence of budget support would undermine the effort of enhancing tax 
revenues through pro-growth policies. Pedersen (2001) further argues that even 
if donors accompanied aid with “good policies”, inconsistency and credibility 
problems would not allow them to significantly change the outcome.
As even the most aid-optimistic researchers acknowledge that inadequate 
policies are as important as the lack of savings in explaining the poor 
performance of SSA economies (Sachs and Warner, 1997), the overall 
impact of aid inflows would crucially depend on their effects on the quality of 
macroeconomic policies and institutions. For instance, if aid disbursed to SSA 
induces worse macroeconomic policies it is no longer obvious that it would 
lead to higher economic growth and less poverty. This uncertainty has raised a 
hot and long debate on the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid in that region.
A number of empirical studies on the macroeconomic impact of aid in 
SSA have already been conducted. Some found that aid positively impacts on 
growth (for instance, Houdou, 2010; Fayissa and El-Kaissy, 1999; Juselius et 
al., 2014; Tombofa et al., 2013) and some found the opposite (Akankor, 2008; 
Girijasankar, 2008; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Ogundipe et al., 2014).
An “intermediate” group of studies argues that aid would work (or work 
better) under sound political and economic environments (for instance, Collier, 
2006; Denkabe, 2004; Ekanayake and Chatma, 2010; Kathavate, 2013). Let’s 
exemplify this inconclusive empirical debate by revising four recent studies on 
the effectiveness of foreign aid in SSA:
On the one hand, Houdou (2010), investigating the long-term effect of 
foreign direct investments and foreign aid on growth in 36 African countries 
from 1980 to 2007, found a positive but low impact of aid: a 1% increase 
in foreign aid resulted “only” in a 0.05% increase in growth. In contrast, 
Girijasankar (2008), in a cointegration analysis of the six poorest and most 
aid-dependent African countries (Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Sierra Leone and Togo), found that the long-term effect of aid on growth was 
negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, Denkabe (2004) reconciled 
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these two opposite outcomes by arguing the existence of decreasing marginal 
returns to aid and thus the existence of a threshold volume (i.e. a turning point) 
below which aid stimulates growth and above which it undermines growth. In 
the same vein, Kathavate (2013) spelled out the negative aid-growth elasticity 
with a quantitative political economy model for SSA; his empirical findings 
showed that the aid-growth nexus significantly fluctuates with the quality of 
institutions in which aid operates.
Put together, these four papers show that the issue of whether aid is 
effective in SSA is not a “yes or no” answer. Aid performance in this region 
depends on several factors and, given the inconclusiveness of the debate, 
further investigations are still necessary for a better understanding of whether, 
when and how foreign aid stimulates economic growth and poverty reduction.
3. odA mAcroeconomic eFFectiveness in ssA: model speciFicAtion And empiricAl 
FrAmework
A. analytical framEwork
Despite the fact that ODA is recognised as a heterogeneous development 
instrument —as is the case in the previously mentioned papers—, it is 
surprising that most studies on SSA neglect that nature of aid flows. Mavrotas 
and Nunnenkamp (2007) convincingly argued in favour of considering aid 
heterogeneity in the assessment of its effectiveness; otherwise, the assessment 
is more likely to be biased or misunderstood. Hence, some aspects of aid 
heterogeneity have recently been considered by distinguishing aid types 
according to either their targets and objectives or their delivery modes. 
Although this has not yet been done for the case of SSA, this has proved to be 
useful in giving deeper insights into the effectiveness of aid.
For instance, by considering sectorial allocation, Thiele (2007) revealed 
that aid was less likely to contribute significantly to the MDG because donors 
claimed to fund the latter while they were practically funding unrelated 
sectors. Assessing the effectiveness of aid according to incentives behind 
modality choices, Jain (2007) questioned donors’ prioritisation of project-
based aid while general budget support seemed more efficient, and noticed 
the willingness of donors to impose their preferences on recipient countries. 
Furthermore, Mavrotas and Ouattara (2007) distinguished between ODA 
projects and financial programmes and revealed that the latter induced higher 
government final consumption while the former increased capital expenditure. 
Elsewhere, Tezanos et al. (2013) distinguished between two aid modalities 
(aid loans and aid grants) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, 
and concluded that the impact of loans was greater than the impact of 
grants, a result that —according to the authors— supports the use of both aid 
modalities in a middle-income region such as LAC, despite its long record of 
debt unsustainability problems.
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As a matter of fact, these studies have paid little attention to SSA and to 
date it has not yet been explored the potential of considering the two different 
aid modalities (aid grants and aid loans) in SSA. Therefore, we have developed 
an analytical framework accounting for these two aid modalities: aid grants 
and aid loans. As previously argued by Chang et al. (2002) and Tezanos et 
al. (2013), such a model disentangling overall ODA in these two components 
should give deeper insight into the existence of perverse aid effects and the 
extent to which they undermine the potential of aid to boost and sustain 
growth.
Hence, following the usual Barro (1991) methodology, we assume that GDP 
per capita growth  of a country  between years  and   is an increas-
ing function of the initial GDP per capita  and a linear combination of 
explanatory variables   :
 (1)
As we are interested in the specific effects of the two aid modalities, we dis-
entangle  in aid grants (G), aid loans (L) and a linear combination 
of other explanatory variables disregarded in the model :
 (2)
As our second aim is to estimate the effects of these aid modalities on the 
inequality-adjusted growth, we then shift our focus from the overall income 
to the mean income corrected from inequality. We use the superscript “ia” 
to mean inequality adjusted. Drawing on Mongongo (2016),  is corrected 
from inequality ( ) using the complement to one of the Gini coefficients:
 (3)
As Mongongo (2016) explained,  corrects mean income 
from inequality. Indeed, in the case of perfect inequality,  is 1 and 
hence  is 0. Consequently  is disregarded in poverty reduction analy-
sis since it fully excludes almost everybody from the economic prosperity. In 
the case of perfect equality,  is 0 and hence  equals . 
is entirely considered since it is perfectly inclusive and fully cancels out the 
relative poverty. The remaining cases lie between the two. For instance, at the 
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median case where   is  half  is taken into account and hence
. 
It is worth noting that, in case of data availability, we could have the option of 
correcting income from inequality using detailed decile income distribution as it 
was done in Tezanos et al. (2013) and Castells-Quintana et al. (2015). While the 
complement to one of GINI coefficient corrects the mean income from inequality, 
the decile-based method considers the entire income distribution. 
By substituting  with  in Equation 2, we have:
 (4)
Equation 4 enables us to assess the impact of aid on mean income 
corrected from inequality. This is worthwhile since aid is expected to reduce 
income inequality —especially within the SDG agenda, which aims at poverty 
eradication and inequality reduction (UN, 2015: 6-7).
All in all, we retain expressions 2 and 4 as our analytical models. They 
do not assume equal growth impact coefficients of aid grants and aid loans 
(i.e.  ≠  and ≠ ). Indeed, aid loans and grants have very different 
financial natures. On the one hand, aid loans are refundable and exert a 
positive incentive to productively invest the resources in order to be able to 
meet the future repayment obligations, as they cannot be diverted without 
default risk. This would significantly reduce the perverse effects of aid loans in 
comparison to those of aid grants.
However, aid loans generate external debt, which may compromise the 
future financial capacity of recipient countries and hence undermine their overall 
effectiveness. Specifically, the impact of aid grants will be positive ( , > 0) 
if their stimulus on growth compensates for the negative effect on productive 
incentives. Similarly, the impact of aid loans will be positive ( , >0) if 
their stimulus on growth compensates for the debt burden’s negative effect. In 
both cases, productive allocation includes expenditures in social sectors such 
as in education, health and governance, which indirectly increase production. 
For instance, education and health do it through positive impacts on labour 
productivity and good governance via positive impacts on private sector’s 
working environment.
In this setting, we check the following seven disputed hypotheses regarding 
the effectiveness of aid in SSA:
· Hypotheses of overall aid effectiveness
H1:   > 0: Aid as a whole exerts a positive impact on the unadjusted 
growth (where  combines  and ).  
H2:  > 0: Aid has a positive impact on the inequality-adjusted growth 
 combines  and ).  
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· Hypotheses of different impacts of aid grants and loans 
H3:  > : The impact of aid grants on the overall economic growth is 
higher than the impact of aid loans.
H4: > : The impact of aid grants on the inequality-adjusted growth 
is higher than the impact of aid loans.
· Hypotheses of inclusive aid impact
H5:  > : The impact of aid grants is higher on the inequality-adjust-
ed growth than on the overall growth.              
H6:  > : The impact of aid loans is higher on the inequality-adjusted 
growth than on the overall growth.
H7:  > : In aggregated terms, the impact of aid is high-
er on the inequality-adjusted growth than on the overall growth 
.
While H1 and H2 evaluate the overall aid effectiveness, H3 and H4 assess 
the existence of aid distorting effects. In the case of a lack of institutional 
distortions, the estimation is expected to confirm these two hypotheses. It 
is possible to compute the related magnitude with and without inequality 
adjustment by using the following expressions:
 (5)
 (6)
where  and  capture the expected extra effectiveness associated 
with aid grants considered as the most favourable loan. In line with Sachs 
(2005a), this would be the adequate “big push” to overcome the poverty 
trap in SSA. In contrast, if H3 and H4 are empirically rejected, it will mean 
that the higher vulnerability of aid grants to political distortions outweighs 
the above-mentioned advantage. In this case, grants distort economies more 
than they stimulate them (as claimed by Moyo, 2009). To evaluate the overall 
effectiveness, H1 and H2 merge the effects of aid grants and aid loans with and 
without inequality adjustment. If empirically confirmed, in aggregated terms 
the stimulating effects of aid are higher than its distorting effects. Hypotheses 
H5, H6 and H7 jointly assess inclusiveness by respectively assuming that the 
impacts of grants, concessional loans and total aid are higher on the inequality-
adjusted economic growth than on the unadjusted economic growth.
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b. identiFicAtion procedure 
Let us recall that in Equations 2 and 4 both  and  are endogenous 
variables. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that both the eligibility 
criteria to aid grants and to aid loans and their respective volume partly 
depend on the income levels of the recipient countries. This would introduce 
the reversed —or double— causality bias in the estimation. On the other hand, 
several phenomena —such as armed conflicts, institutional quality and natural 
resource endowments— affect both economic growth and aid inflows, thereby 
causing the omitted variable bias. Consequently, we need an appropriate 
estimation method that enables us to identify the unbiased causal effects of 
each β from Equations 2 and 4.
Most of the previous empirical studies use lags of endogenous variables as 
instruments identifying exogenous impacts.1 However, the double causality in 
our model is so obvious and too heavy to be tackled by such weak instruments. 
This is due to the fact that levels of recipient countries are one of the main 
eligibility criteria for both aid grant and aid loans. Consequently, the existence 
of feedback effects is irrefutable and hence modelling them should lead to 
better estimates.  We therefore resort to a VAR model which. It is worth recalling 
that the estimation of a VAR model does not need control variables. Indeed, in 
case of existence, a valid VAR regresses itself so good enough that the average 
effect of unconsidered explanatory variables is null. 
Within the VAR framework, the coefficients ,  ,  and  of Equations 
2 and 4 are portions of the responses from impulses in the aid equations of two 
three-series VAR models with GDP per capita  without inequality adjustment (
) and with inequality adjustment ( ). This is due to the feedback effects that 
these models incorporate into the direct impacts captured by the  coefficients 
of isolated equations such as Equations 2 and 4.  
Expressions of the two VAR models that we need are derivable from the 
general expression of the VAR model. A  dimensional VAR process  can 
be written as:
 (7)
where  is a multivariate vector including all the time series considered 
as part of the VAR model. 
We derive Equation 8 corresponding to the VAR process assessing the first 
and third hypotheses:
1 For instance, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004), Clemens et al. (2004), Dalgraad et al. (2004), 
Djankov et al. (2009), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Heady (2008), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), 
Roodman (2007) and Tezanos et al. (2013) carried out IV estimations within the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator’s framework.
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(8)
We take into account the inequality adjustment to assesse the second and 
the fourth hypotheses. This is done by replacing income ( ) by mean income 
corrected from inequality ( ) in Equation 8. Besides that, it is worth noting 
that the assessments of the remaining three hypotheses combine information 
from these two VAR models.
c. variablEs and sourcEs
Table 1 summarises the proxies used for the estimations and Table 2 
provides their descriptive statistics. The database includes all of the 51 SSA 
countries that were listed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
between 1991 and 2014, as “developing countries” and thus potential ODA 
recipients.
tAble 1. vAriAbles’ description And inFormAtion sources
Variable Description Sources
GDP





Annual GDP per capita, constant prices,
 US $ (Year 2005=100).
World Bank 
(2016)




Annual GDP corrected for inequality, constant 
prices,
 US $ (Year 2005=100).
World Bank 
(2016)
Inequality adjusted GDP 
per capita
Annual GDP per capita corrected for inequality,




Percentage of total donors’ ODA grants net dis-
bursements over recipients’ GDP in each period, 
constant prices, US $ (Year 2013=100).
DAC (2016)
Aid loans
Percentage of total donors’ ODA loans net dis-
bursements over recipients’ GDP in each period, 
constant prices,
 US $ (Year 2013=100).
DAC (2016)
78 Pacifique Mongongo Dosa, sergio Tezanos Vázquez, naDia Molenaers 
According to the DAC (2016), disbursed grants and loans refer to the actual 
international transfer of financial resources from donor to recipient countries. 
They are recorded as net when repaid principals of earlier loans are already 
deducted from the current gross values.
As grants have no repayment components, their net values are equivalent 
to their respective gross values. However, the net and gross values are different 
for concessional loans. As we want to compare the relative effectiveness of 
these two aid components and their policy implication in SSA, we opt for net 
loans since they account for the repayment burden. To consider the relative 
weights, we resort to aid grants and loans as percentage share of the annual 
GDP. Unlike their absolute values, the relative values in terms of the recipients’ 
GDP give a more realistic insight into the importance of each aid modality 
in comparison to the size of each recipient’s economy. Likewise, we use GDP 
and inequality-adjusted GDP in per capita terms instead of total values to 
neutralise the ‘population size effects’ and hence evaluate the actual impacts 
on people’s income.
d. linEarity issuE
Such a VAR procedure has a drawback of assuming linear nexuses among 
the univariate components of the considered auto-regressive multivariate 
vector. However, this is not that a considerable issue as we have considered 
aid grants and aid loans in percentages and GDP growth is in percentage by 
construction. Indeed, this boils down to the usual pre-estimation linearization 
of most nonlinear models which comes up with estimates in terms of relative 
and not absolute variations.
e. prE-Estimation diagnostics
As VAR models are made for stationary processes, we first need to carry 
out a stationarity analysis on the variables in order to select and estimate 
tAble 2. descriptive stAtistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
GDP 24 6.413e+11 189957084070 4.239e+11 1.007e+12
GDP per capita 24 867.8 92.54641 768.8 1034.0
Gini coefficient 24 0.4502 0.03378995 0.3773 0.5344
Inequality adjusted GDP











Aid grants 24 4.654 1.76979 3.306 12.420
Aid loans 24 0.5088 1.421734 -5.8860 1.6430
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the valid VAR models, including their respective stationary forms2. On the one 
hand, the plots, the auto- and partial correlation functions together with the 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests prove that GDP and inequality-adjusted GDP are 
stationary after being log-differenced once. Such a transformation is quite 
interesting since it leads to their respective growth rates.
On the other hand, grants and loans are stationary without any additional 
transformation. As we have considered their respective percentage share of 
GDP, they are also expressed in percentage as GDP growth itself. Consequently, 
our estimates will be interpreted as elasticities (the percentage change in 
economic growth induced by one percentage change in grants or loans). With 
regard to the model selection, we select the appropriate order, minimising the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC or SC), the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQ) and Akaike’s Final 
Prediction Error criterion (FPE).
For the unlimited maximal lag, the FPE suggests VAR (3) while the rest 
suggest VAR (4). As in this case both VAR (3) and VAR (4) are expected to be 
valid, we select VAR (3) in order to gain one additional degree of freedom. Table 
3 provides values of these information criteria for a maximal lag of 3.
As shown in Table 3, FPE, AIC and SBIC criteria strongly prefer VAR (3) 
to both VAR (1) and VAR (2). The SC criterion strongly rejects VAR (1) and 
slightly prefers VAR (2) to VAR (3). As for the SC criterion, the difference in 
the minimal values for VAR (2) and VAR (3) is negligible and the other selec-
tion criteria strongly suggest VAR (3). We therefore choose VAR (3) as the 
most appropriate to the statistical structure of our data set. Nonetheless, the 
statistical validity of the estimates of this model lies in the assumption that 
the residuals from the estimation are drawn from a multivariate white noise 
error term. This means that, on average, its univariate components should be 
zero (E ( ) = 0), the correlations among them should not exist either at lead 
or at lag (cov ( ) = 0 ∀ k > 0), and that the covariances should be 
2 Even though they may deviate for a little while, stationary processes fluctuate around their means 
(or trends) over time. In the case of deviation, they will definitely revert back to the latter. Therefore, 
resorting to the stationary forms of GDP, aid grant and aid loans ensures that our estimations do not 
merely provide spurious relationships driven by time, which would simultaneously cause changes in 
all of them in the case of non-stationarity.
tAble 3. vAlid vAr selection pArAmeters
Criteria VAR (1) VAR (2) VAR (3)
  AIC(n) 0.7706621 0.1472333 -0.26292832
HQ(n) 0.8716115 0.3238948 -0.01055474
SC(n) 1.3671499 1.1910869 1.22829112
FPE(n) 2.2030356 1.2921101 1.09350781
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constant (cov( ) = Σ). Graphic 2 and Tables 4 and 5 provide the outputs of 
our tests of this set of assumptions.
Indeed, both the auto and partial correlation functions depicted in Graphic 
2 confirm that the residuals from the selected VAR (3) are uncorrelated both in 
lead and in lag (cov ( ) = 0 ∀ k > 0). Furthermore, as summarised in 
Table 4, they all have zero means (E ( ) = 0).
In addition, Table 4 shows that both the lower and the upper limits of the 
ranges of these univariate residuals are relatively close and their respective 
medians are close to zero. As they summarise variables disregarded in the 
model, this assures us that the latter have not biased our estimates. Table 5 
reinforces this result by showing that the three univariate components of the 
multivariate residual have constant variances.
grAphic 3. dependency structure oF the residuAls From oF the retAined vAr (3)
tAble 4. descriptive stAtistics oF residuAls oF the estimAted vAr (3)
Res. 
Stat. From GDP growth eq. 1( ) From GRANTS eq. 2 ( ) From LOANS eq. 3 ( )
Min. -1.24942 -1.5664 -2.3084
1st. Qu. -0.50148 -0.8573 -0.3989
Median 0.03491 -0.2039  0.1620
Mean 0.00000 0.0000  0.0000
3rd. Qu. 0.45376 0.4304  0.6805
Max. 1.66794 2.9834  1.2354
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As already observable at lag zero of the cross-correlation function between 
aid grants and aid loans in Graphic 2, the contemporaneous correlation 
between the residuals from their respective equations is large and statistically 
significant. As VAR models do not assume zero contemporaneous correlations 
among residuals but only zero cross-correlations in lead and in lag, this does 
not question the validity of the selected model.
All in all, the pre-estimation diagnostics confirms that this multivariate 
residual is a sample of a white noise process and consequently confirms the 
validity of the retained VAR (3) model.
4. mAin results
According to our estimations (Table 6), a 1% increase in aid grants has 
raised SSA growth rate by around 2.46 percentage points, and an equivalent 
increase in aid loans has had a greater impact on growth (with an average 
coefficient of 3.05). These results suggest that, on the one hand, the positive 
impact of aid loans compensates for the inconvenient repayment burdens 
attached to them. On the other hand, although aid grants are relatively less 
effective than aid loans in promoting growth, they still exert a positive and 
significant impact.
It is worth recalling that net aid loans disbursed to SSA are relatively low 
in comparison with aid grants (they represent 0.51% and 4.65% of GDP, 
respectively). However, according to our estimations, loans exert a relatively 
higher effect on growth than grants (roughly 0.6 percentage points of extra 
tAble 5. covAriAnce And correlAtion mAtrixes oF the selected vAr (3)
Covariance
   
1.2047 0.1508 -0.1493
0.1508  2.7665 -2.0647
    
-0.1493 -2.0647 1.6350
Correlation
   
1.00000 0.08262 -0.1064
0.08262  1.0000 -0.9708
  
-0.10642 -0.97082 1.0000
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effect). It is worth noting that this 0.6 difference is statistically significant and 
economically considerable. Consequently, this suggests that a reallocation 
of ODA from grants to loans would stimulate higher economic performance. 
Obviously, this reallocation is only promising for those countries with 
sustainable debts.
Apart from these direct effects, both grants and loans may be affected by 
feedback effects from growth on them, or by their mutual interactions. The 
first part of Table 7 shows that an increase in economic growth does not affect 
either aid grants or aid loans. However, one would expect the opposite as lower 
levels of GDP per capita strengthen the eligibility of getting both grants and 
concessional loans. This is not the case because the level of SSA per capita 
GDP is still relatively low (in comparison with other developing regions) to 
consider that its growth rate is a sign that the region has become developed 
enough to handle its growth path with less —or no— foreign assistance.
Moreover, the second part of Table 7 shows that an increase in aid loans 
has a positive and significant impact on aid grants, whereas the third part 
of the table shows that an increase in aid grants does not have a significant 
impact on aid loans. This suggests that the previously mentioned efficiency 
tAble 6. direct eFFects oF grAnts And oF loAns on economic growth
Lag 1 Std. Error P-Value Lag 2 Std. Error P-Value Lag 3 Std. Error P-value
Aid grants (1) 2.45982 0.75452 0.00984 -1.05074 1.30316 0.44085 -1.13834 0.92391 0.24913
Aid loans (2) 3.04601 0.86623 0.00655 -0.96044 1.58779 0.56019 -1.31964 1.05220 0.24137
(2) – (1) 0.5862 0.23953 0.01830 0.09030 0.98036 0.67040 -0.18130 0.29197 0.77170
tAble 7. g d p  g r o w t h  FeedbAck eFFects And grAnts- loAns interActions
1. Feedback effect of 1% of increase of GDP growth on both grants and on loans
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid grants 0.008206 0.985 0.162785 0.634 0.554216 0.184
Aid loans -0.17311 0.617 0.01438 0.956 -0.51200 0.118
2. Direct effects of 1% of increase of aid loans on aid grants
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid loans 2.630868 0.076 -1.561343 0.533 0.698197 0.672
3. Direct effects of 1% of increase of aid grants on aid loans
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid grants -0.80268 0.385 1.11574 0.481 -0.62921 0.573
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gain from the loans-to-grants reallocation would never lead to an extreme 
situation where all donors give all ODA in the form of loans. In fact, grants serve 
some donors’ priorities that loans cannot serve and hence they would never 
completely replace the former modality. That is the case with ODA funding 
the fight against terrorism or underpinning policies controlling migration from 
recipient countries. It is also the case with ODA funding projects that promote 
donors’ values, interests and convictions such as democracy and human rights. 
On the one hand, recipient countries would have no —or very little— incentive 
to negotiate or to accept ODA in the form of loans in these cases. On the 
other hand, grants also allow donors to get a relatively higher control of such 
sensitive targets and make recipient countries more accountable to them.
Graphic 3 depicts the overall impacts accounting for all the feedback and 
interaction effects —including effects that are too small to be statistically 
considered and hence were disregarded in the previous discussion. Exploring 
this Graphic from right to left, the first Figure depicts the overall percentage 
change in GDP growth and aid grants induced by a temporary 1% increase in 
aid loans. As already quantified in Table 6, such an impulse causes an increase 
in GDP growth, but it also increases the level of aid grants. Both GDP growth 
and aid grants keep growing until the impulse is off (i.e. when ‘aid loans’ touches 
the horizontal axis). 
This matches our previous results suggesting that aid loans have a positive 
impact on growth and that aid grants complement aid loans to fund specific 
interests that the latter cannot adequately fund. The second Figure shows the 
overall percentage change in GDP growth and aid loans caused by a temporary 
1% increase in aid grants. As already quantified in Table 6, economic growth is 
increased by such an impulse. Subsequently, Figure 3 confirms that aid grants 
exert a positive impact on growth.
Furthermore, although we previously explained that aid grants do not affect 
aid loans, the second Figure shows that an increase in aid grants decreases aid 
loans. This is not a contradiction but another way of presenting the same fact. 
Indeed, drawing on Table 7 (part 3), a 1% increase in aid grants induces a 0.8% 
decrease in aid loans. The p-value (0.385) suggests that this 0.8% impact is 
grAphic 4. overAll impActs: direct, FeedbAck And interAction eFFects
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not significantly different from zero and hence it has been disregarded in our 
previous explanation. However, the impulse-response function still visualises 
such a negligible effect to give an insight into the global interactions within the 
estimated VAR model. Unlike aid grants —which are a strategy complemented 
by aid loans— this suggests that loans may be substituted by grants. In other 
words, donors may partly replace aid loans with aid grants without jeopardising 
their strategic objectives. However, in addition to the foregone repayments, the 
previous results suggest an efficiency loss in such a reallocation. Consequently, 
it should only be done when necessary. Countries with unsustainable debt 
burdens would logically benefit from such an exceptional reallocation of ODA.
Figure1 of Graphic 3 visualises the small feedback effects of economic 
growth on both grants and loans. Although statistically insignificant, they predict 
that foreign aid should never be considered a never-ending funding source for 
the development of SSA. Indeed, they suggest that the more donors assess 
SSA’s GDP as relatively high, the fewer grants and concessional loans they will 
provide. Therefore, as SSA economies are growing relatively fast, policymakers 
should already start thinking about alternative sources to sustain the financing 
of the ongoing development process. Obviously, one of the available options is 
resorting to market funds.
Beyond these impacts of both grants and concessional loans on SSA 
economic growth, what has been the effect on the “inequality-adjusted” growth 
rate? In order to test this, we estimate a similar VAR model and carry out 
the same analysis using the inequality-adjusted GDP per capita growth rate. 
The estimation offers a worrisome result: neither concessional loans nor grants 
have statistically significant impacts on the inequality-adjusted growth (Table 
8, Part 1), and the latter has no significant effects on either aid grants (Table 8, 
Part 2) or aid loans (Table 8, Part 3).
In comparison to the positive and strongly significant effects for the case 
without inequality adjustment, this suggests that aid in SSA is not targeting the 
poorest citizens well —and/or it is used in a way that its effects on the poorest 
citizens can only be observable over a much longer period of time.
Moreover —as happened in the benchmark case without inequality 
adjustment—, Part 4 of Table 8 still confirms that an increase in aid loans 
induces a significant increase in aid grants. Similarly, Part 5 of Table 8 again 
confirms that an increase in aid grants does not induce an increase in aid loans. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the positive and significant effect of an increase 
in aid loans on aid grants implies neither a direct nor an indirect positive effect 
of aid loans and grants on the inequality-adjusted growth, not only because 
neither of these two aid modalities have a significant impact on the inequality-
adjusted growth but also because the latter has no significant feedback effects 
on either modality.
This result —aid and its component do not significantly stimulate mean 
income corrected from inequality— is consist with recent empirical papers on 
the aid macroeconomic ineffectiveness such as that of chong et al. (2009) 
finding that aid has no significant impact on poverty and inequality and that of 
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Bourguignon et al. (2009) finding that aid has a very small significant impact on 
poverty and inequality merely for the lowest deciles of the income distribution. 
This implies that on average it has no significant impact as shown in our VAR 
model regressed on the mean income corrected from inequality.
5. conclusions
The new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development pledges to eradicate 
poverty in 15 years and, once again —as previously happened with the MDGs—
, most of the attention is on SSA, as this is the region with the highest extreme 
poverty rates, but it is also the main global recipient of foreign assistance. 
Given that the average income in this region is too low to generate savings and 
to sustain the necessary level of economic growth to achieve the SDG, a good 
functioning of ODA is crucial to make sure that SSA will not be left behind. 
Therefore, shedding light on the seemingly never-ending controversy about the 
effectiveness of aid in this African region is especially timely.
Previous studies on the macroeconomic effectiveness of foreign aid have paid 
very little attention to the assessment of the existence of aid-growth distorting 
effects in SSA. Therefore, this paper investigates aid effectiveness from two 
tAble 8. interActions between gdp growth Adjusted For inequAlity, Aid grAnts And Aid loAns
1. Direct effects of 1% of increase of aid loans and aid grants on inequality adjusted growth
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid grants 3.3160 0.4377 2.4655 0.7122 -3.0835 0.4676
Aid loans 3.7477 0.4558 2.4655 0.7122 -3.1991 0.5341
2. Direct effect of 1% of increase of inequality adjusted GDP growth on aid grants
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid grants 0.07756 0.5109 0.07987 0.3250 0.07186 0.3593
3. Direct effect of 1% of increase of inequality adjusted GDP growth on aid loans
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid loans -0.04860 0.6113 -0.07640 0.2527 -0.06541 0.3086
4. Direct effects of 1% of increase of aid loans on aid grants
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid loans 3.59512 0.0411 -3.98019 0.1378 1.39057 0.3939
5. Direct effects of a 1% of increase of aid grants on aid loans
Lag 1 P-Value Lag 2 P-Value Lag 3 P-value
Aid grants -1.91754 0.0995 2.52522 0.1616 -0.97783 0.3716
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research perspectives: firstly, analyses the relative impacts of aid grants and aid 
loans on the rate of growth of SSA countries’ per capita income and on the per 
capita mean income corrected from inequality during the period 1991–2014; 
and secondly, explores the main distorting effects that ODA causes on the 
recipient economies. Recognising the heterogeneous nature of ODA flows, we 
examine the relative effects of aid grants and aid loans on economic growth and 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these two aid modalities. The lack of 
repayment burden on poor countries has been considered the major strength 
of aid grants but it has also been associated with higher risks of investing such 
concessional resources into unproductive activities. Conversely, aid loans are 
generally considered to exert positive incentives to productively invest the 
resources in order to be able to meet the future repayment obligations, but 
they also generate a debt burden that may be unsustainable for some poor 
countries. Therefore, we assumed for the estimations that the net impact of each 
aid modality is positive if its strengths compensate for its weaknesses.
Given that both aid grants and aid loans not only affect economic growth 
but are also impacted by the latter within a kind of ‘loop of causality’, we use 
VAR models in order to incorporate such interdependencies and control the 
effects of other omitted processes that would otherwise bias the estimation 
results. The econometric estimation points out four relevant results in relation 
to the aggregate impact of ODA in SSA:
Firstly, although foreign aid exerted both distorting and stimulating effects 
on SSA’s economic growth, its overall net result was significantly positive. This 
positive net impact underpins the optimistic aid stream (Fayissa and El-Kaissy, 
1999; Juselius et al., 2014; Sachs, 2015; Tombofa et al., 2013, and others) 
against the aid sceptics (such as Akankor, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Ogundipe et al., 
2014). However, it also confirms the concerns raised by the latter about the 
existence of aid distorting effects —even though they are assessed to be lower 
than expected.
Secondly, while both aid components have positive and significant impacts 
on economic growth, aid loans are relatively more effective than aid grants. 
Subsequently, both an increase of each of these two aid modalities and a 
reallocation from aid grant to aid loans for a given amount of ODA are expected 
to induce higher growth.
Thirdly, a reallocation from aid grants to aid loans would provide an 
adequate incentive to use aid resources in a more productive way, but its 
complete implementation —100% loans versus 0% grants— is not practical as 
some strategic targets of ODA are incompatible with aid loans. Nonetheless, 
donors still have relatively wide room for manoeuvre since ODA to SSA is 
largely delivered in terms of grants. Moreover, the success of such reallocation 
assumes that the debt burden of the recipient country is sustainable; otherwise, 
the opposite reallocation —from aid loans to aid grants— would be preferable.
Fourthly, foreign aid does not significantly impact mean income corrected 
from inequality. This is an alarming result as ODA is officially intended to 
reduce poverty and inequality —especially if it is intended to underpin the 
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SDG target of poverty eradication and inequality reduction. This result —aid 
and its component do not significantly stimulate mean income corrected from 
inequality— is consist with recent empirical papers on the aid macroeconomic 
ineffectiveness such as that of Chong et al. (2009), finding that aid has no 
significant impact on poverty and inequality; and that of Bourguignon et al. 
(2009), finding that aid has a very small significant impact on poverty and 
inequality merely for the lowest deciles of the income distribution. This implies 
that, on average, aid has no significant impact as shown in our VAR model 
regressed on the mean income corrected from inequality.
In sum, our findings support both the increase in ODA resources to SSA in 
the SDG era and the use of both aid grants and loans in this —mainly— low-
income region. Furthermore, we cannot infer that concessional loans are totally 
preferable to grants; on the contrary, grants should still be concentrated in 
those African countries with lower repayment capacity and more restricted 
access to credit. But the use of concessional loans should be increased in 
those economies that need resources for financing productive activities, offer 
guaranties of repayment and are more affected by institutional distortions. 
Therefore, this piece of research opens the door for future analysis on the socio-
economic, political and institutional conditions that are more appropriate for 
the —effective— use of aid loans and grants.
Finally, even though we made all the necessary tests to make sure the 
estimated VAR model is valid, we welcome further investigations including other 
robustness checks in line with our findings. Among many other options, one 
could consider extending the investigation to different regions and time periods.
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